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zationA. INTRODUCTION
1. In the 1987 study "On the Determinants of Brazilian Exports",
two hypotheses figured prominently. First, it was stated that
Brazil's comparative advantage was in unskilled labor intensive
products and secondly that policy interventions rather than in-
ternal factors were responsible in fostering Brazil's capital
intensive exports . By following the advice to investigate these
issues in more detailed studies for individual sectors of in-
dustry, this essay is challenging those two postulates and will
provide evidence to come to different conclusions.
2. In pursuing answers to the above questions this study con-
tinues the line of analysis undertaken earlier in the Kiel Insti-
tute by examining another crucial sector of the Brazilian metal
working industry: capital goods, or more precisely, non-electri-
2
cal machinery & equipment (NEM) . However, differently from the
major emphasis in the steel and automotive sector studies, which
were testing the hypothesis if Brazil enjoyed a locational ad-
vantage in producing standardized capital intensive goods, the
story of Brazilian NEM starts from the premise that it is un-
likely that Brazil or any other LDC is currently able to outper-
form the advanced countries on a broad front in a sector charac-
terized by human capital intensity, but that it has been and will
be possible to find niches in world markets which may be rapidly
expanding given the current pace of technological change. The
question is, if it can be done efficiently and if it is taking
place in subsectors with standardized machinery and equipment, or
if LDCs can also excel and export more complex machinery the
production of which requires very different skills from what used
to be common only a few years ago.
Fasano-Filho et al. [1987]. Although the rise in capital
intensive exports could be justified with the help of the
product-cycle hypothesis, the incentives were found to be
excessive.
For an investigation of Brazil's steel and automotive sectors,
see Fischer, Nunnenkamp et al. [1988].3. In order to determine the efficiency issue, we will investi-
gate the role of the policy framework and contrast that with a
closer look at the factors of production and their management.
The NEM sector is known to be skill intensive. How did Brazil
marshal the human resource necessary to build and export machi-
nery and equipment at a significant scale? How rapid has been the
adaptation and further development of technological change? How
did the sector raise the financial resources to invest so heavily
in the past 20 years? All three questions are interrelated and
have to be examined jointly.
4. Traditionally, we understand under capital goods the pro-
duction of [1] non-electrical machinery and equipment (NEM), [2]
electrical, electronic and telecommunication apparatus and equip-
ment, and [3] transport equipment. In the latter two cases con-
sumer electronics and non-commercial vehicles are excluded. With-
in the first group we distinguish among the following major bran-
ches: pumps, motors, engines and turbines, machine parts, all
kinds of industrial as well as agricultural equipment and machi-
nery, and office machinery. It is the export record of this group
of products which we want to discuss and evaluate in some detail.
5. While not a large subsector among the NEM group, machine
tools occupy a special place. They represent the heart of capital
goods, i.e. machines producing machines. For many LDCs that
branch has symbolized industrialization and everything which it
provides, from more rapid output and employment growth to master-
ing technology and foster human resource development. While world
production and exports are dominated by the advanced countries
because of the subsector's relatively high degree of sophistica-
tion and skill requirements, the electronics revolution has cata-
These three groups are classified under the International
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 382, 383, and 384,
respectively and the Standard International Trade Classifi-
cation Rev. 1 (SITC) 71, 72 and 73. For different subgroup
classification see Table Al.pulted Japan from a modest midfield position in world output and
exports to the top within less than twenty years. Japan, and now
increasingly some other East Asian countries are radically chang-
ing the comparative advantage in this industry from firms which
possessed a lot of skilled manual labor to firms which are mas-
tering electronics. As a consequence, the development of the
machine tool branch will be used to qualify to the general find-
ings of Brazil's production and exports of machinery and equip-
ment, by giving more detailed insights in a sector which is cha-
racterized by a high degree of diversification and rapid techno-
logical change.
6. Having stressed the difference between this and previous
sector studies, it remains to be emphasized that the major ques-
tion and issues tackled in the automobile and steel sectors are
also examined in the machinery and equipment part, i.e.
to analyze and demonstrate to what extent Brazil has been
able to penetrate foreign markets in the case of capital
goods in general, and which particular items in the machinery
branch had either special success or faced serious obstacles;
to examine the principal factors which have been responsible
for the subsector's accomplishments and shortcomings, distin-
guishing particularly between endogeneous (factor costs) and
exogeneous (policy) variables;
to identify and discuss problems and bottlenecks that now
hamper the rapid and efficient development of non-electrical
machinery and equipment as well as propose alternatives which
should foster future production and exports.
7. Following that line of reasoning the essay is divided into
five major parts, covering
(a) the worldwide characteristics and structural change of the
NEM sector in general and the machine tool sector in parti-
cular,(b) the performance of Brazil's machinery production and exports,
and an assessment of its position in world machinery markets,
(c) an examination of the major policy variables having in-
fluenced Brazil's NEM exports and imports,
(d) a review of factor productivity and a comparative cost analy-
sis of some NEM products.
(e) prospects for this subsector in the years to come.
With the first part being more descriptive and the last part
being somewhat speculative, the analysis will concentrate on
parts (b) , (c) and (d), and with the use of several statistical
techniques attempt to gain insights into issues of relative
factor productivity and comparative advantage of the Brazilian
machinery sector in general and the machine tool industry in
particular, and with it provide insights into the current weak-
nesses and strengths of that sector.B. NON-ELECTRICAL MACHINERY - WORLDWIDE FEATURES AND STRUCTURAL
CHANGE
1. The group of products falling under the category of non-elec-
trical machinery comprise a vast amount of different machines,
equipment and components, ranging from small tools, dies and jigs
to large and complex machine centers. As a consequence, it is
difficult to generalize and to find common characteristics. Eco-
nomies of scale may or may not play an important role within the
same subsector, and individual markets which are dominated by a
few leadings firms may be more competitive than segments where
the concentration ratios are smaller.
2. Since a good part of machinery is custom made, the production
runs are small in such branches as machines for food processing,
chemicals, wood-working and most other specific industries. Typi-
cally these machines are produced in medium or smaller enter-
prises. On the other hand, there are quite a number of products
where economies of scale play an important part, including en-
gines and turbines, agricultural and small office machines, as
well as ball- and roller bearings. The latter products are prod-
uced in large factories, which may however also be engaged in
multiple production runs for small-batch production, making it
difficult to achieve economies of scale.
3. It is then no surprise that empirical studies relating labor
productivity to size of production gave a positive correlation in
the case of agricultural machinery, but a negative one in the
case of machine tools and textile machinery (Pack, 1981). Simi-
larly, an analysis of market structure and concentration ratios
is at best of limited relevance in an industry which is charac-
terized by a great degree of heterogeneity. Typically, the branch
consists of some large firms and many small- and medium-sized
enterprises, which tend to be highly specialized. The latter
firms are especially active in the production of parts and compo-
nents, and they are closely connected with larger firms through
subcontracting or subsidiary-parent relationships .
For a more thorough survey see UNIDO [1984].4. Having pointed out the diversity and differences of non-elec-
trical machinery should not prevent us from examining those
features which have determined the location of production and
their international trade pattern. For once, firms in that sector
are not only labor but "skilled" labor intensive, a characteri-
stic which was noted of playing a vital role in explaining inter-
national trade flows only twenty five years ago (Keesing, 1967).
Factor Intensity in NEM
5. Table 1 presents summary data of relative skill intensities
of the NEM branch vis-a-vis the rest of the manufacturing indus-
tries. Following Lary (1968), we are using the industries' wage
and salary payments per employee to reflect labor and especially
skilled labor intensity, and the non-wage value added per employ-
ee to characterize capital intensity. In all three cases, i.e.
advanced market economies, centrally planned economies and the
newly industrialized countries, it is shown that the NEM branch
is relatively human resource intensive and less intense in using
capital than the rest of the manufacturing sector. The average
ratios among the three groups are very similar, although there
are wider differences if individual countries are considered (see
Table A2).
































Source: Appendix, Table A2.6. Evidence on the technology intensity of the NEM industries
can be derived from the statistics of R&D expenditures and man-
power used during the last 20 years in the OECD countries. The
data summarized in Table 2 again reflect the relative intensity
of skilled manpower in the NEM branch contrasted with the manu-
facturing sector as a whole. In both cases, i.e. research scien-
tists and engineers to total employees as well as R&D expendi-
tures as percent of gross output, the percentages of the NEM
industries are clearly above the industry average, resulting in
average ratios of about 1.3 .
Table 2 - R&D Intensity in NEM of Major OECD Countries, 1975
Indicators of R & D Intensities
(1) Research scientists & engineers/






























7. The latter characteristics are not only a consequence of a
long historical tradition in a branch which prides itself with
quality workmanship, but also a result of intense worldwide com-
petition and a need to increase productivity and reduce costs.
The rapid development of world trade and the increasing labor
costs in the advanced countries during the post-war period led to
To what extent the more than proportional input of R&D in the
NEM branch has led to a process and product innovation will be
discussed below.innovations in producing labor saving machinery. In the Anglo-
saxon countries automated machinery increased its share in total
NEM sales from 10% in the 1950s to over 30% in the 1970s (Coombs,
1981). That tendency accelerated in the mid-seventies with the
introduction of electronics into the engineering sector, particu-
larly in the machine tool production process.
8. Given these features, it is not surprising that the advanced
countries have an overwhelming share of the production and world
trade of NEM. However, there have been substantial changes in
world output and trade since WW II and chances for the NICs to
break into the rich club in various branches and subsectors. It
is the task of the following part to point out where they have
been opening up and to what extent Brazil has been able to parti-
cipate in that endeavor.
World Production and Trade
9. Graph 1 portraits the distribution of world machinery pro-
duction between 1963 and 1985. World output trebled in real terms
within two decades from about US$ 80 close to 240 bill. Although
production in the developing countries increased by a factor of
four, it only reached US-$ 12 bill, in 1980, just crossing 5% of
total world output. But while the relative distribution among
advanced market-, centrally planned-, and developing countries
hardly changed in the 1960s (83%:15%:2%), the contribution of the
latter two groups of countries rose to about 25% and 5% respec-
tively during the decade of the 1970s, and managed to hold on to
those shares in the first parts of the 1980s.
10. A similar picture emerges with respect to world trade. Table
3 shows the continuous dominance of the advanced countries in
world exports with a share of about 85% since the early 1960s.
True enough, the UK and the US have lost significant market
shares, but they have been captured first by Japan and to lesserValue added of NEM
Cbill.US $ 1975)
Graph 1
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Table 3 - World Exports of NEM and Shares of Major Participants,
1963-1985
Exporter
Total value of NEM
exports (US$ bill.)



















































































Source: United Nations [1978 and 1986].
extent by some EEC countries. While the centrally planned econo-
mies saw their participation decline from over 14% to 11%, a few
developing countries have gained a foothold. Among seven newly
industrializing countries, Brazil, Singapore, and Taiwan suc-
ceeded to increasingly export less sophisticated machinery into
both, the markets of developed and developing countries .
11. The revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of the major compe-
titors in this branch has been found to be positively related to
2 per capita income . However it is interesting to note that while
2
this correlation is significant, the R coefficient is only 20%,
leaving plenty of other explanations for the determination of ex-
The other countries include Argentina, India, South Korea and
Yugoslavia.
Dick [1981].11
port competitiveness. More importantly than per capita income
were the two other factors pointed out above: skills and tech-
nology. In the first case a regression analysis between the RCA
of individual firms in the NEM branch with the relative share of
employees working in research and development, design as well as
the amount of skilled workers relative to total employment ar-
rived at positive and significant coefficients. In the case of
technology, the degree of product and process innovation in this
branch, which were substantially above the industry average in
the major machine producing countries, turned out to be an im-
portant criterion for export competitiveness (see Table A3).
Interestingly enough, there was no clearcut positive correlation
between high R&D expenditures and manpower on the one hand and
technological innovation on the other, which would seem to in-
dicate that the success in achieving technological breakthroughs
requires more than just high powered inputs.
12. One variable, which turned out not to be significantly relat-
ed to the RCA of machinery is the size of the domestic market.
That finding would again reflect the problem with economies of
scale in determining efficiency and competitiveness in this
field. In the case of West German firms, there was not only a
negative relation between export competitiveness and size of firm
but also between the RCA and unit output. According to Table 4,
Germany has been specializing in the first group of products,
most of which are produced in small batches and are also rela-
tively more skill intensive. On the other hand, imports from LDCs
have increased from the more standardized products of the second
and third group.
13. Before tracking the development of the Brazilian NEM sector
and examining its export performance over the last 30 years, we
will discuss the machine tool industry to gain some insights into
issues of technological change and rapid structural transforma-
tion of worldwide production and export patterns. While the above
Table 4 indicates that this branch is characterized by small bat-
However it should be noted that the R&D employment alone did
not bring the expected results.12
Table 4 - Typical Production Size for Selected Categories of Machinery
Production Methods
Single part and small scale and production
Smelting equipment, rolling mills
Industrial furnaces
Mining equipment














Office and information equipment
Agricultural machinery
Instruments
Sewing and clothing machines



















































Source: Dick [1981].des Instituts fur Weltwirtschaft
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ches In the advanced countries, it will be shown that it is ex-
actly here where conventional lathes are produced at larger
numbers and that those machines have been exported successfully
by Brazil and other newly industrializing nations to their more
advanced counterparts, which have moved on to produce more
specialized machine tools.
Machine Tools: Changes in Technology, World Production and Trade
14. Machine tools, the power driven machines used for cutting,
shaping or processing metals and other materials into desired
forms, date back to the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain,
where John Wilkinson invented the horizontal boring mill about
two hundred years ago. Ever since then an increasing amount of
machine tools have been produced to serve in such industries as
clock and instrument making, heavy capital goods for the textile
and railway equipment producing firms, sewing machines and type-
writer production and finally for the mass production of auto-
mobiles at the beginning of the 20th century.
15. From the beginning, arms production played an important part
in developing new machine tools, but it was only in World War II
that after the invention of the computer, the U.S. Air Force
commissioned research into electronically controlled machine
tools. The first numerically controlled milling machine used
paper tape output from a computer, but faced difficulties to be
accepted by other than the aerospace industry because of its high
costs. That situation changed dramatically with the introduction
of inexpensive microprocessor based controls by the Japanese in
the early 1970s.
16. As a consequence of the early inventions and the demand of
machinery and equipment in the advanced countries of the world,
production was centered in Europe and the United States for most
of this and the previous century. As Table 5 indicates, even
after the innovation of computer numerically controlled (CNC)
machines in 1975, the U.S., West Germany, and the USSR dominated14
Table 5 - World Production and Exports of Major Machine Tool Producing
Countries, 1975 and 1980
















































































Source: American Machinist [various issues].15
the field with nearly 45% of world production. That situation
did, however, change dramatically in the 1980s, as Japan took the
lead by capturing 25% of world production in 1986.
17. Machine tools have always been a highly tradable good, with
an export-output ratio reaching 30% in the 1950s and 1960s. It
increased to about 45% in the mid-seventies and remained at that
level in the 1980s. The pattern of world trade is similar to that
of world production - a high degree of concentration in a few
countries and a rapid growth of Japan's share in the late 1970s
and early 1980s at the costs of the previous market leaders'
shares.
18. In contrast to the rapid changes on the top, production and
exports of the five major LDCs advanced more gradually. Neverthe-
less, they have raised their share in world production from 3% to
close to 6% and their export share from less than 1 to close to
3% within the last ten to fifteen years, and it would seem that
some of them have not only taken over markets of traditional
machine tools now abandoned by the advanced countries, but are
also making determined efforts to produce and eventually export
CNC machinery.
19. The current trend in the industrially advanced countries is
towards flexible and integrated manufacturing (FMS and CIM), in
which the tool and work piece design, scheduling, transport and
dispatch are automated and closely coupled. Besides increasing
the time that the CNC machines spend in actual machining, such
systems aim to save manpower and space, cater to changing market
demands by producing a large variety of products innovatively,
and reduce inventory costs through "just in time" manufacturing.
It is interesting to note, however, that while the Japanese
export-output ratio was nearly .5 in 1987, its import-consump-
tion ratio did not even reach .1, way below the world average
of .3, but characteristic for the difficulty to penetrate that
market. The only other country which has a similarly low import
consumption ratio is Brazil which was .12 in 1987. See Table
A4.16
20. While in a number of branches the participation of CNC ma-
chines has rapidly increased over the years, reaching over 50% in
lathe, boring and milling machine production (see Table A5) ,
conventional machine tools have kept a significant market share
in less affluent subsectors and remain advantagous with respect
to the variety of parts which can be produced with them, as the
following graph indicates. General purpose machines (GPMs) are
producing small batches and machine a large variety of parts,
while special purpose machines (SPMs) and transfer lines are
designed to produce a given component in large numbers. Here
productivity is high, but the system lacks flexibility and varie-
ty. The flexible machine system and centers (FMS and FMC) are in
the middle and seem to combine both of the characteristics and
possibly advantages. However, while they optimize the machinery
cycle on a component, idle periods can be high cost unless proper
tools, workpieces and machining programs are rapidly made avail-
able. This would indicate that - for the time being - the machine
tool group is heterogeneous enough to have newcomers and
innovators capture market shares in specific niches of that in-
dustry.
22. As Table 5 has shown, world production of machine tools more
than doubled between 1975 and 1986. If we adjust for inflation,
real growth was 20%. Those two statistics hide the fact that,
while growth was exuberant in the late 1970s, it became negative
in the early 1980s. A good indicator of what happened in that
industry are the U.S. data on productivity and investment. In the
first case output per employee fell from an average of US-$ 75
thous. between 1978 and 1982 to close to US-$ 52 thous. in 1983/
87. Similarly, investment in that industry dropped from US-$ 215
mill, to US-$ 125 mill, during the same time periods. While the
U.S. suffered a much more severe decline of the machine tool
industry in the 1980s than the other industrialized countries,
world production, productivity and investment did fall between
1981 and 1985, but have since then recovered.17
Graph 2
Trade-off Between Scale Economies and Flexibility of






Variety of Manufactured Parts
SPM = Special Purpose Machines
FMS = Flexible Machine Systems
FMC = Flexible Machine Centers
CNC = Computer Numerically Controlled Machines18
C. STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BRAZIL'S PRODUCTION AND TRADE OF NEM
Importance of Machinery Production in Historical Perspective
1. Capital goods production has been an important activity in
the Brazilian economy for over 100 years. Although its share in
total manufacturing value added did not cross the 10% mark until
the 1950s, equipment for a booming agro-export and transport
sector was already produced and repaired by a rapidly growing
number of machine shops during the latter part of the 19th cen-
tury. Led by the production of machines for coffee hulling and
sugar refining, most of the producers were active in supplying
equipment to the food processing industries and to a lesser ex-
tent to the transport sector.
2. Two characteristics stood out in those early days: the
public's intense interest in technical aspects and innovation of
machinery; and the relative openness of the sector towards im-
ports. In the latter case, it has been pointed out that although
capital good imports received low tariffs and preferential ex-
change rates, the ratio of domestic production over total do-
mestic demand was high compared with other countries at a similar
stage of development (see N. Leff, 1968). In the first case,
technical expertise and interest - particularly in the Sao Paulo
region, which has remained until today the home of over 75% of
machine producers - came with the immigrants, who brought with
them their skills and capital to start up production in the New
World.
3. Growth in production of capital goods was determined by the
growth of the other industrial activities until the 1930s, when
the Great Depression cut world trade to a trickle and forced many
a Latin American country to substitute for imports. For Brazil,
machinery was one sector in which domestic producers were able to
respond quickly to the challenge, and as a consequence that
branch expanded by 12% p.a., which was twice the rate of industry
as a whole. While the shortage of inputs during World War II
decelerated that growth rate, both the manufactured sector as a
whole and capital goods in particular managed to average 7.5%
between 1940 and 1945.19
4. The 1950s witnessed renewed strong growth and innovation in
the machinery sector, particularly after President Kubitchek laid
the foundation for the indigenization of the automobile industry.
Policies which.encouraged large scale import substitution activi-
ty and openly invited .foreign investment led to growth rates
above 10% p.a. for over a decade in the capital goods sector.
While continued overvaluation of the currency stimulated imports
in general, quantitative restrictions (until 1953) and the Law of
Similars, which allowed imports only when a similar machine was
not manufactured in Brazil, had the import-consumption ratio fall
from 40% to 30% within a few years.
5. The exuberant period of strong expansion was followed by a
rapid acceleration of inflation which turned into stagflation in
the early 1960s. Although the foreign exchange constraint led to
more stringent import controls, reducing the import-output ratio
to 10%, significant cuts in public investment spending had rather
immediate effects on the capital goods industries, which expe-
rienced a number of crisis years leading to significant excess
capacity. Output advanced very slowly for a number of years, even
after the economy was back on its way to a more stable recovery
in the mid-1960s.
Development of Capital Goods Production and Trade, 1965-1985
6. The growth record of the NEM industries during the last 25
years is recorded in Table 6 and Graph 3. Induced by favorable
policies, which brought relative stability of price changes, ex-
pectations and profits, domestic demand boomed, taking with it
overall investment as well as specific demand for new machinery
and equipment after excess capacity was used up. As demonstrated
in the graph, with GDP expanding at an average rate of 10% during
the early 70s, the investment-output ratio climbed to over 20%,
and the ratio relating machinery purchases to GDP averaged over
8%.20
Graph 3
GDP Growth and Investment Ratios 1970 -1987
in Percent
nvestment(in%ofGDP)
Mach & Equip. In vestment
/
-6
1970 1975 1980 1985
Source: FGV [various years].21
Table 6 - Output and Employment of Brazilian Capital Goods Industries 1965-87














































































































































































Source: FIBGE [b, 1979, 1980; c, various issues].22
7. While not accelerating quite at the same pace as output,
employment grew in large numbers from less than 200 to close to
300 thous. between 1972 and 1973, and it reached over 500 thous.
at the end of the decade. When recession hit in the early 1980s,
employment declines were much less than the output cutbacks,
following the capital goods sector's tradition of keeping most
skilled workers during the downswing of the business cycle and
employing them in renovating the firms' proper capital infra-
structure. For the period as a whole the employment-output ela-
sticity was close to .7, substantially above the one in the other
capital goods industries. By 1984, total employment in the NEM
branch was slightly above the combined employment of the elec-
trical machinery and transport equipment sectors.
8. Those were the years in which the subsectors belonging to
non-electrical machinery made significant advances by raising
their share in total industrial production to over 10%. Con-
trasting NEM's actual share with the normal share estimated by a
cross-country comparison between 1970 and 1977, shows that Brazil
jumped ahead and surpassed its normal share by a factor of 1.2
(see Table A6) . Growth was particularly strong in engines and
machine parts, but as is demonstrated below, branches such as the
machine tool industry also grew in leaps and bounces.
9. Strong growth continued during the latter part of the 1970s.
However, the source of that growth changed dramatically as shown
in Table 7. While earlier growth was mainly induced by the expan-
sion of the domestic economy and to a modest degree by export
diversification, the new policies of import substitution espe-
cially designed for the capital goods sector after the first oil
crunch, became a major factor in determining the growth of that
sector and its principle branches.23
Table 7 - Sources of Growth 1970-1985















IS = Import Substitu
EX = Export Diversif



























































































Source: World Bank [1983] and own calculations.24
10. The second oil shock in 1979 hit Brazil harder. Import sub-
stitution was intensified, but policy makers ran out of steam to
further stimulate capital goods sector production. With the fall
in public investment, the demand for machinery and equipment
dropped precipitously. The ratio of equipment sales-to-GDP fell
from an average of 8.5% in the 1970s to 5% in the early 1980s, at
a time when GDP growth itself hardly remained positive (see Graph
3 and Table A7). While the latter variable recovered somewhat in
the second half of the 80s, demand for investment has remained
shaky, leading to renewed excess capacity and attempts to find
some outlets in international markets .
11. A branch which especially suffered from the decline in in-
vestment activity of capital goods was the machine tool industry,
which sells over 40% of its products within the NEM sector. After
experiencing rapid expansion during the boom years of the 1970s,
output fell substantially between 1981 and 1984, before recovery
began in 1985. As Table 8 indicates, exports did reasonably well,
but imports were drastically curtailed, with the import-consump-
tion ratio declining from an average of 45% to less than 15%
between 1983 and 1987. This change in policy was part of a gene-
ral strategy to control imports in order to save foreign ex-
change. In this case it was to a large extent a consequence of
legal steps to reserve CNC machine tools for domestic producers,
the causes and consequences of which will be discussed below in
some detail.
According to Table 7 the role of export diversification in-
creased in supporting GDP growth during the early 1980s, and it
is remarkable that it was much more important in the NEM sector
for output growth than in the other two subsectors. However,
that contribution may be not representative for the mid-80s as
a whole, since 1985 was an exceptional year for exports, where-
as domestic output was still at depressed levels.25
Table 8 - Brazilian Machine Tool Consumption, Production, and Trade, 1974-1987














































































































Source: Computed from "American Machinist" [various issues]
Machinery Exports: Problems and Progress
12. After a slow start in the 1950s and 60s, Brazilian machinery
exports succeeded to penetrate foreign markets more forcefully in
the 1970s. Table 9 indicates that NEM exports which were only
US-$ 17 mill, in 1965, surpassed the $ 100 mill, mark in the
early 1970s and climbed to over US-$ 1.5 bill, in 1980, a level
which it only reached again in the mid-1980s. The rapid increase
in NEM exports vis-a-vis other Brazilian exports is reflected in
the rising share, which doubled from 10 to 20% of total manufac-26
Table 9 - Brazilian NEM Exports and their Direction to Major Markets,
1965-1985
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tured exports within less than 10 years during the 1970s. How-
ever, it fell below 15% in the following years, mainly because of
drastic declines of sales to Brazil's major markets in this
branch: the members of the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA), which had changed into the Association for Latin Ameri-
can Integration (ALADI).
13. Exports of machinery to other Latin American countries, with
which Brazil had special trade agreements, were a natural first
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. During the mid-1970s a gradual
diversification took place with respect to both, products and
markets. The diversification drive is depicted in Graph 4 for a
number of machinery products which succeeded to significantly
increase both, their products and markets. A further change
occurred in the early 1980s, when Brazilian machinery exporters
started to concentrate on the US market to compensate for the
loss of the Latin American share. To what extent it will be pos-
sible to maintain that foothold in the US and at the same time
expand sales again in Latin America after the debt crisis becomes
less crippling for imports and investment there remains to be
seen. The fact that it has been possible to maintain total ex-
ports and shift 20% from developing to advanced countries within
five years speaks favorably for the flexibility of Brazilian
machinery exporters.
14. A look at the export performance ratios of Table 9 confirms
the above observations. While Brazil's comparative advantage
vis-a-vis the rest of the world suffered a setback in the 1980s
after it had gradually improved in the 1970s, its trade position
with the United States reflects a position of relative strength,
which could turn into comparative advantage in the years to come.
The export performance ratios with developing countries in gene-
ral and with the other Latin American countries in particular
decreased, but they remained above 1, i.e. Brazil kept its
relative advantage in those markets.29
15. By examining subsector export growth, it becomes obvious that
engines experienced the most rapid rate of expansion, selling
over 660 mill. US$ in 1985 (see Tables A8 and A9) . They were
followed by office machines, which lost however some of their
rapid advancement shown earlier in the late 1970s and 1980s. Both
products were linked to multinationals which had determined that
Brazil's location would give them a comparative advantage. It is
characteristic that on place 3 and 4 two items of heterogeneous
product groups were listed : Heating and cooling equipment as
well as pumps and centrifuges, each of which come closer to
annual exports of US$ 100 mill, in the early 1980s. Among those
which averaged about $ 50 mill., three very different types of
machinery emerged, namely construction and mining machinery,
sewing machines, and more recently paper mill machinery.
16. Ranking the different 4-digit SITC machinery exports accord-
ing to their total export earnings in 1978 and 1985, and compar-
ing them with earlier indicators of different skill and research
intensities, led to a rank correlation of -.7. That would indi-
cate that Brazil's NEM did concentrate within this branch on the
"right" kind of products in which it was able to penetrate world
markets. As Table 10 shows, an increasing part of the NEM prod-
ucts went to the USA and other advanced countries. It is, how-
ever, noteworthy that while Brazil kept second and third posi-
tions in most machinery exports from the NICs, its distance from
the market leaders (most often the East Asian competitors Taiwan
and South Korea) widened in several product groups, such as metal
working, textile and leather machines, as well as machines for
2
other special industries .
That heterogeneity may also explain why US importers have not
yet raised the issue of countervailing duties for NEM prod-
ucts, as they have done for steel and some metal products.
These are industries in which Brazil not only experienced
decreasing export shares among competitors from other NICs,
but in which also performance ratios were below the average of
other subsectors (see Table 10, Row (5)).30
Table 10 - Perforuance Indicators of Brazil's NEM Exports
SITC
71 Non-electr. Machinery
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Source: Table A8, own calculations.31
17. Information from the machine tool industry highlights Bra-
zil's effort to expand exports of machinery in a more erratic
manner. While foreign sales remained at less than 30 mill dollars
for most of the 1970s, averaging 6% of production, a sudden burst
in 1980, caused by high demand of oil rich Mexico had exports
more than doubled to over 70 mill, for two years (see Table 8).
This was followed by a return to the level reached in 1978, which
increased as a share of production because of the extraordinary
low level of domestic output in the early 1980s. Only recently
machine tool exports have risen to close to US$ 40 mill, reflect-
ing the ability of Brazilian machine tool firms to get a foothold
in markets selling traditional machine tools, production of which
has been abandoned by most firms in advanced countries.
18. The extraordinary expansion of Brazilian NEM exports in the
1970s demonstrated the country's ability to capture new markets
in a "skill intensive" sector. While the strongest branches were
the ones producing standardized products, such as engines and
pumps, it is noteworthy that export performance has also been
remarkable in new and more sophisticated products, as the export
growth of the paper mill machinery indicates. What has to be exa-
mined now is the question to what extent the mix of Brazilian
trade policies has furthered or hindered the export strategies of
the firms producing non-electrical machinery and equipment.32
D. GOVERNMENT INCENTIVES AND THEIR IMPACT ON EXPORT COMPETITIVE-
NESS
1. The analysis of the sources of growth has shown that Brazil
went through two very distinct periods of capital goods develop-
ment during the 1970s. While domestic demand dominated the first
part of the decade, with export expansion just about equalling
the decline in import substitution, the second five years showed
the rising importance of renewed import substitution and a simul-
taneously healthy export expansion drive. But while imports were
further curtailed in the eighties, export diversification kept up
its drive, partly to compensate for cutbacks in domestic output.
What has to be examined are the macro- and sector policies of the
Brazilian government, reacting to two oil price shocks in the
early and late 1970s, in order to separate the impact of interna-
tional developments in the rise and fall of capital goods ex-
ports, and the effect of government incentives in the determined
shift towards a "closed" capital goods sector.
Import Protection Policies and Effective Protection
2. During the strong expansion of the economy in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, capital goods production prospered as did capi-
tal goods imports. Policies were pragmatic and non-tariff bar-
riers were quasi non-existent. Even the Law of the Similars was
handled in a most flexible manner, with the effect that the in-
dustrial sector was able to thoroughly modernize its capital
stock at relatively competitive world prices. All that changed
with the oil price shock of 1973/74, and the launching of the
Second National Development Plan (1974-79), which initiated a
conscious effort to reduce imports in general and promote the
private domestic capital goods industry in particular.
3. The data of Table 11 speak for themselves. Legal tariffs were
increased for all capital goods and remained at high levels
throughout the 1980s. In spite of a recent tariff reform, total
legal import protection stayed at about 50% for all three major33
Table 11 - Tariff & Non-Tariff Barriers of Capital Goods, 1975-1988
(in Percent)


























































































Legal import tariff rates
Realized tariff revenues as % of imports
Before tariff reform of July 1988
After tariff reform
Total import protection, including import tariffs, taxes and
transport costs
Proportion of tariff codes subject to non-tariff barriers
Proportion of imports subject to NT barriers
Source: Tyler [1981]; Braga et al. [1987]; Guimaraes [1988], Kume [1988].34
subgroups of the capital goods sector. With the domestic sales
tax (IPI) and the transport costs being added, import protection
amounted to 85% in 1988/89. At the same time, however, actual
import tariffs paid or realized decreased for the NEM group from
22.7% in 1975 to 17.2% in 1984. In the case of individual NEM
products, realized tariffs as percent of the official legal rates
were even lower, reflecting the many exemptions and special ar-
rangements the government has created for imports.
4. That problem is even more pronounced in the other two sectors,
in which the difference between legal and realized tariffs has
been widening conspicuously. In 1984, the actual rate of collect-
ed import tariffs was about 10% of the legal one in the case of
electrical equipment and 2.5% in the case of transport equipment.
While the fiscal erosion of the import tariff is linked to the
attempt of the policy makers to strengthen the export incentives,
the import protection function of the tariff has been taken over
by non-tariff barriers, which increased from less than^1% to 20%
of total imports of NEM products and from 1% to 33% of all tariff
codes between 1975 and 1985. In the case of electrical and
transport equipment, special regulations were controlling 58% and
27% of total imports of these two sectors in 1985.
 :
5. The increased use of quantitative restrictions on the one hand
and special exemptions on the other has made it ever more diffi-
cult to estimate the degree of import protection for the capital
goods industries. However, empirical studies of international
price comparisons have been made from time to time, indicating
substantial tariff redundancy and an increasing degree of com-
petitiveness, especially in the non-electrical machinery branch.
A number of examples are given in Table 12. The price comparisons
of various machine tools as well as agricultural and textile
machinery were undertaken in 1978 and show that the price differ-
ence of these selected products of the NEM branch averaged 7%,
i.e. Brazilian machinery seemed to be quite close to what the
international competitors had to offer. What Table 12, however,
also indicates is a rather wide dispersion around that average,35














































































































even in the case of different models of the very same product.
Given the problem that in a large number of cases no two machines
are exactly equal and therefore comparable, it is important to
look at the following sector estimates of nominal and effective
protection with some caution.
6. Studies of nominal and effective protection have been under-
taken for the Brazilian manufacturing sector from time to time,
beginning with a joint study by Bergsman and Malan in 1966/67,
continued by Tyler in the mid-seventies, the World Bank in 1980,
and a team of researchers at two Brazilian research organizations
for 1985. From the summary data presented in Table 13 it becomes
obvious that nominal or implicit protection, which averaged about
50% in the late 1960s was maintained at that level in the seven-
ties, but has apparently been reduced in the eighties, in spite
of the renewed and repeated protection efforts of the Brazilian
government since 1974.
7. The development has been quite different in the other two
branches of the capital goods industries. Nominal protection for
electrical equipment and apparatus remained over 70% for most of
the decade of the seventies and has only dropped in 1985 to
around 50%. On the other hand, price comparisons with products in
the transport equipment branch resulted in an average which is
slightly below zero, i.e. Brazilian products in that sector were
offered at lower prices than similar products in world markets.
While the 1985 estimates show again a positive figure of 12%, the
impression remains that this branch should have been most compe-
titive in the recent past, a picture which is confirmed by the
rapidly rising export figures presented earlier.
8. In order to consider the competitive situation of an industry,
it becomes important not only to look at its output but also at
its input prices. This is done through the concept of effective
protection which compares the value added of a product in domes-
tic prices with the value added of the same product in internati-
1 Bergsman, Malan [1971]; World Bank [1983]; Braga et al.
[1987] .37
Table 13 - Nominal and Effective Protection Estimates of Capital Goods Industries, Based on
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Sources: Bergsman, Malan [19711; World Bank [1981], Braga et al. [1987].38
onal prices. It is obvious that effective protection is higher,
equal or less than nominal protection if domestic input prices
are lower, equal or higher than international prices for the same
product. In the case of machinery and equipment, steel and other
metals are important inputs. Since their prices have been con-
trolled at levels close to international prices during most of
the 1970s and 1980s, effective protection in the case of NEM was
above nominal protection in 1980. Five years later, however,
inputs of the expensive electric and electronic branches had
increased to such an extent that effective protection fell below
nominal protection. The same had already occurred earlier in the
transport equipment sector, which uses heavily inputs of the two
other capital goods branches.
General and Specific Incentives for NEM Producers and Exporters
9. In the discussion of import protection three further issues
have to be mentioned, because they have influenced the relative
competitiveness of foreign and domestically produced capital
goods substantially during the last ten to fifteen years. They
are: (1) exchange rate policies, (2) fiscal and monetary incen-
tives, and (3) direct regulations, which have played an ever
increasing role in determining investment and imports of capital
goods in Brazil.
10. Exchange rate policies have been pursued for a number of
often conflicting objectives in Brazil as well as in other in-
dustrializing countries. Since the need to stabilize the infla-
tionary pressures of the economy was felt most urgent, overva-
luation was common. That meant, however, that imports became
automatically cheaper relative to domestically produced goods,
and in the case of machinery a tendency to buy abroad and to go
into more capital intensive industrialization than would have
otherwise been desireable. Overvaluation also led to domestic
producers clamouring for high tariffs to receive "just" protec-
tion .
For a more detailed discussion of the importance of electronic
parts in machine tool production, see Table 18 and text.39
11. After the 1964 price stabilization program, successive Bra-
zilian governments wanted to maintain the real purchasing power
of the currency, and indeed several studies of the 1970s showed
that the cruzeiro underwent very little change between 1973 and
1979 in real terms (Pastore et al. , 1978, von Doellinger, 1979).
However, the previous overvaluation had not been eliminated, and
as a consequence observers of the economy maintained that the
shadow exchange rate remained about 30% above the actual one
during that time. With accelerating inflation in the eighties it
became even more difficult to keep up the real value of the Bra-
zilian currency. Although earlier studies showed that overvalua-
tion was diminished in the mid-1980s (Kume, 1988), the exchange
rate adjustments lagged again behind inflation by mid-1989. It
is, however, interesting to note that prices of NEM products
increased less than other products in Brazil, a fact to be taken
up again in some detail below.
12. Monetary and fiscal incentives were more direct and dis-
cretionary. In the first case, a special Agency for Industrial
Finance (FINAME), which was established in 1964, developed a
credit program for domestically produced capital goods, offering
short term loans at below market interest rates. It was estimated
that this measure led to a subsidy of up to 10% in the late 1970s
(see Tyler, 1981). A larger subsidy could be derived by receiving
investment finance from the National Development Bank (BNDES),
providing long term credit not only at below the market interest
rates, but also on a base of frozen monetary correction at 20%.
Because of the accelerating inflation, estimates set the actual
interest rate at -16.5% for a typical loan taken in the latter
part of the 1970s (see Table A10).
13. The fiscal incentives are closely connected with the govern-
ment's direct interventions and regulations and consisted of
three major types. The first and most important bundle of incen-
tives consisted of reductions or exemptions of the industrial
production tax (IPI), tariffs, and the state level commodities
circulation tax CICM). The second and third benefits were given
to purchasers of domestically produced capital goods and con-40
sisted of accelerated depreciation, which was double the , normal
rate, and IPI tax credits. These benefits were given by a number
of government agencies and were in most cases project and product
specific. As a consequence, the range of protection of NEM prod-
ucts was extremely wide as shown in a number of examples in Graph
5.
14. In the case of industrial equipment and machinery for ex-
ample the domestic producer could get an import protection of
over 150%, if his product received all the possible incentives,
whereas the foreign competition had to overcome the full tariff.
On the other hand, it was possible to face tough competition in
case the purchaser of the imported good received tariff and tax
reductions while the subsidies for the domestic producers were
not granted fully. With so much at stake, it was a natural to pay
more attention to government agencies and their decisions rather
than to production and marketing issues.
15. C How were these incentives to be obtained? First and most
importantly, by submitting investment projects to the Industrial
Development Council (CDI) which made concerted efforts to reduce
their import content. In the 1980s, CDI's incentives were in-
creasingly substituted by those granted by the Ministry of Fi-
nance under the BEFIEX program, which provided fiscal benefits
for special export programs to large firms. These measures became
the most powerful and uneven export incentives benefitting the
large export houses.
16. The Trade Department of the Bank of Brazil (CACEX) had also
an important role to play in evaluating capital goods imports.
That agency seems to have applied the Law of the Similars on a
stricter level during the last ten years than ever before. More
importantly, CACEX officials are holding tripartite discussions
with the investor and the domestic capital goods producer to
examine the import content and the possibility of domestic sub-
stitution. In addition to those three national government agen-
cies there exist a large number of regional development agencies
and institutions and sectoral development agencies. The resulting41
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multitude of incentives "renders all coordination of industrial
policies virtually impossible" (Tyler, 1981).
17. While it became apparent in the late 1970s that such a dis-
cretionary system had serious drawbacks, ranging from the above
mentioned diversion of entrepreneurial talent to continued uncer-
tainty of a system which was suffering from increasing fiscal
deficits, two major reform efforts in 1979/80 and 1988/89 do not
seem to have broken but merely changed the system of controls and
regulations. The results are not difficult to find: a lack of
flexibility and adjustment, which the external shocks of the last
fifteen years required, and concentration of assets and power,
which would seem less to be linked to efficiency and more to
influence and tradition.
18. Inspite of the heavy emphasis on import substitution in the
capital goods sector, export diversification played an increas-
ingly important role in the case of non-electrical machinery.
Brazil is a price taker in the world of NEM. As a consequence,
one should assume that the firms in that branch would base their
decision to either sell in the domestic or foreign market on
relative profitability, which is determined by the net impact of
the overall incentive system. After having discussed and quanti-
fied the protection for the domestic markets, it remains now to
do the same for the export market and then evaluate the degree of
pro- and anti-export bias.
Net Incentives and their Impact on NEM Exports
19. Realizing the need to diversify and expand exports more
rapidly in the 1960s, Brazilian policy makers have developed a
whole battery of export incentives, which attempted to compensate
for both, the taxes and tariffs paid on inputs as well as for the
overvaluation of the currency. But since the rate of devaluation
was highly variable over most of the years, the impact of the43
incentives became highly uneven, depending on the degree of in-
flation and the index used. Increasingly, policy-makers rewarded
export performance of individual firms. In the case of machinery,
these were mainly domestic producers, since most foreign estab-
lishments in that branch were medium sized and more oriented
towards the Brazilian market.
20. Among the monetary incentives, prefinancing and financing of
exports proper was very popular, reaching amounts of over US$ 1.6
by 1980. As in other credit incentives discussed earlier with
respect to the BNDES, it was the prefixing of a low monetary
correction which helped to provide the exporter with a subsidy.
While the producer had to pay an interest rate of over 80% for
his domestic transactions, he was able to get away with 24% for
exports. That difference increased with the acceleration of
inflation .
21. In the fiscal field, in addition to the drawback mechanism,
the Brazilian government offered at one time or another exemp-
tions of indirect taxes on exports and reduction of corporate
taxes for exporters. The most powerful system became the BEFIEX
scheme, which was established in 1972 to help individual enter-
prises which had long term export commitments with specific
export-incentive packages. Expressed in percent of total export
sales, these fiscal incentives amounted to 10% for the whole
manufacturing sector, slightly less than the monetary incentives
which reached 11.5% in the later 1970s.
22. For the machinery sector as a whole those incentives were a
bit more powerful and reached close to 30% of total sector export
sales by 1980. As Table 14 shows, however, the net export incen-
tives, which were adjusted by the exchange rate overvaluation,
reduced that amount to about half, i.e. 16.7%, a rate which was
In December 1978 the difference reached 85%. See Moura [1981]., 44
below the net nominal protection by just over 10%. Compared with
the other, branches of the capital goods sector and with manu-
facturing as a whole, significant differences emerged at the
beginning of this decade. The net anti-export bias was over 30%
for electrical equipment, it was minus 35% for transport equip-
ment, and nearly neutral with respect to the average of all manu-
facturing activities.
23. If one compares now these indicators of relative profita-
bility with some proxies for export performance, such as export
growth, export-output ratio or the export share in total sales
abroad, the poor performance of the electrical equipment sector
and the strong growth of the transport equipment sector are con-
sistent with the significant pro- and anti-export bias of the
incentive systems in those two sectors. However, in the case of
non-electrical machinery, the rather successful export expansion
goes against the anti-export bias and has to be explained by
other variables, unless earlier estimates of the relative in-
centive system come to very different results . ,
24. In the search for other variables to explain the greater
export competitiveness of the NEM sector, neither excess capa-
city, which may help to sell abroad even at marginal costs, nor
economies of scale were a typical characteristic of the NEM in-
dustry in the 1970s (see Table All). However, rates of return of
that industry were relatively modest, and its profitability
relative to the manufacturing average was below 50% (Table A12).
This phenomenon could have been a consequence of two causes,
inefficiency or a high degree of competition, forcing competitors
to lower prices in order to stay in business.
Rough estimates for 1974/75 confirm the 1980 calculations, see
Tyler [1981]. Similarly Teitel and Thoumi [1986, p. 486] have
mentioned that export incentives "seem to have had the role of
at least partially compensating for overvaluation of the ex-
change rates, domestic taxation, and other forms of discrimi-
nation in favor of production to the domestic market".45
Table 14 - Import Protection, Export Incentive and Export Performance of Capital





































































Source: World Bank [1983], Kume [1988], Guimaraes [1988], own calculations.46
25. As will be shown below, the NEM sector has been found to be
efficient in using resources, and there is evidence that compe-
titiveness was keener in that branch than in most other sectors.
Relative prices of machinery increased much less than the rest of
industry. While the real exchange rate for the manufacturing
sector as a whole, which had rapidly improved in the early 1970s,
deteriorated somewhat in the latter part of the decade (by about
10%), it kept on even keel in the case of machinery and improved
significantly in 1980 before it also declined in 1981 (see Table
A13). Translated into the context of the relative profitability,
the anti-export bias may have well been changed into a pro-export
bias as some data for similar comparisons indeed indicate .
26. More recent information on net nominal protection, export
incentives and anti-export bias come to very similar results and
confirm the findings for 1980. Inspite of the NEM anti-export
bias, the sector's export performance kept up, although growth
rates of exports did not advance as rapidly as in the 1970s. On
the other hand, protection in the electrical equipment sector
remained high and exports kept on being relatively insignificant;
It remains then to be shown which productive' factors contributed
to NEM's performance and if these factors can be relied on in the
future to perform similarly.
The 1981 anti-export bias was estimated to be -1.6 by Tyler
[1983].47
E. THE ROLE OF INPUTS IN DETERMINING NEM'S INTERNATIONAL COMPE-
TITIVENESS
1. The discussion of the role of government policies in helping
or hindering the efficient development of the machinery sector
has shown that on balance the net incentives were anti-export
biased, which did not stop firms in that sector to do well both,
in domestic and foreign markets, at least until the early 1980s.
The explanation of the rather strong export growth was given to
be based on price competitiveness, which helped to sell success-
fully abroad.
2. There is additional evidence that the NEM sector was able to
expand in a more efficient manner than the two other capital good
industries and also to perform better than the manufacturing
sector as a whole. In an analysis of total factor productivity
between 1970 and 1983, Braga and Rossi came to the results shown
in Table 15 below. Whereas factor productivity growth was negli-
gible in both, the electrical and transport equipment sector as
well as for manufacturing as a whole, it grew by 3.5 per cent
p.a. for the machinery sector.

















































































Source: Braga and Rossi [1988].48
3. The relative contributions of the major factors to that
growth are shown in the second part of Table 15. Apparently, the
NEM sector used the raw materials and intermediate inputs and
capital more sparingly than the firms in the electrical and
transport equipment branch. The relative labor intensity left
enough room for a healthy total productivity growth, which
contributed with nearly 30% to the rapid expansion of the
machinery sector during the 1970s and early 1980s.
4. The above findings are consistent with earlier studies one of
which claimed that "during the post-war period and earlier Brazil
has provided a setting when capital goods production was quite
efficient" . Using pooled time series and inter-firm cross sec-
toral data, for the 1970s, Tyler (1981) attempted to examine
sectoral efficiencies with the help of the Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function. He came to the result (reported in Table A14)
that the firms producing industrial equipment and motors as well
as the ones engaged in the production of office machines were
characterized by significant X-efficiency and technological ad-
vancement. In this case, however, the productivity difference
between firms in the NEM branch and firms in the electrical
equipment sector were not significant.
5. Tyler's study further confirmed the earlier findings that
there was no significant relationship between efficiency and
profitability. An attempt to relate efficiency to ownership, i.e.
testing for the hypothesis that foreign firms produced more
efficiently than domestic ones in some capital goods branches
gave a positive but statistically not significant correlation.
Labor Productivity, Skills and Costs in the NEM Sector
6. The analysis of NEM development in post-war Brazil has
pointed out that this sector experienced both, high growth rates
of output and employment. A second look at Table 6 will also show
that labor productivity advanced rapidly, especially in the early
1 See Bergsman [1970, p. 186].49
1970s, when the annual rate averaged 7% and more. Similarly, we
have shown that part of the success in raising labor productivity
must be linked to that sector's ability to attract and train
manpower which became an important factor in a relatively short
time . What remains to be examined are the development of abso-
lute and relative labor costs, as well as the demand for and the
supply of required skills, and the infrastructure which is sup-
porting the labor markets in Brazil.
7. Cost comparisons in the engineering industries between the
newly industrializing and the advanced countries reveal that
machine production by the NICs are characterized by substantially
lower wage levels. While their overall labor productivity has
remained below the one achieved in fully industrialized coun-
tries, that difference seems to be relatively small if one meas-
ures the operator efficiency per machine task. The issue at stake
for LDCs to improve is much more the plant output per man-hour,
which is determined by a number of factors which are linked (1)
to the overall shortcomings of the economy, especially in infra-
structure and (2) to the effects of poor management, ranging from
inadequate plant layout and flow of work to poor inventory con-
trol, production scheduling and the planning of auxiliary acti-
vities .
8. The international comparison of labor costs in the automobile
branch as depicted in Table 16 shows that the NICs keep their re-
lative advantage in labor costs, even if one adjusts for the
differences in productivity. In the case of Brazil, it would seem
See Table A2 in which Brazil's NEM shows level of "human
capital intensity" which is above the average of most other
countries. As mentioned earlier the actual statistics used,
i.e. payments of wage and salaries would indicate that the
acquired skills were paid relatively better than in most other
countries of the world for most of the 1960s and 1980s. As
shown below, however, intervention in the labor market changed
that in the late 1970s and early 1980s.50
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Source: Korea Automotive Industry Corporation Association [1986]51
that relative labor costs were about one fourth to one third of
what they had been in the OECD countries in the early 1980s .
While we do not have a direct comparison for the NEM subsector,
2
it can be maintained that similar difference should exist there .
9. Table 16 also indicates that Brazil's labor inputs relative
to its competitors in South Korea and Mexico were more costly.
Those differences would seem to be less a function of different
wage levels, since real wages in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singa-
pore are today at least at the level of most Latin American coun-
tries, but of the fringe benefits, social security and other
costs related to labor. A summary of these extra costs is given
in Table A16, showing that Brazil's and Mexico's non-wage labor
costs amount to 107% and 78% of actual wages paid whereas the
East Asian countries average is about 50%.
10. With respect to wage differentials between skilled and un-
skilled employees, the census and other data reveal that they had
been increasing for a period of over 10 years from the mid-1960s
to the second part of the 1970s, but that they have been reduced
since then. That development contradicts the more rapid growth of
relatively skill intensive industries, as depicted in Graph 6,
which would indicate a more intense labor demand for the skilled
group than for the unskilled one from 1965 on until the early
1980s, when it reached its peak.
11. Part of the explanation can be found in the wage policy of
the Brazilian government which, in an attempt to prevent the
purchasing power erosion of the lowest wage group, enacted legis-
lation in 1979, which gave a higher adjustment for unskilled
workers than for other employees. The negative effects of these
For similar observations, see Fischer et al. [1988, p. 197].
2
For a comparison of labor costs and average wages in transport
equipment and NEM see Table A15.52
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policies on employment and international competitiveness were
pointed out in a numbe
these measures in 1985"
pointed out in a number of studies, and the government rescinded
.1
12. Another explanation for the more rapid increase of skilled
labor supply and with it the narrowing of the wage differential
can be traced to the improvement of the technical and vocational
infrastructure, which was reinforced in 1975/76 with the creation
of the National Vocational Training System (SENAI) as an umbrella
organization of all existing vocational training programs in
Brazil and the financial incentives for firms to train their own
2
labor . The financial incentives, which are still in effect to-
day, allow the firm to deduct 200% of expenditures made for
training employees from pretax income. Although such deductions
cannot exceed 10% of taxable profits and are subject to explicit
approval from the Ministry of Labor, the fact that by 1985 over
330 firms were providing training for about two million employees
indicates the importance and effectiveness of this incentive
measure. To what extent that measure has contributed to lower the
wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers is diffi-
cult to decide, but firm interviews in 1989 found rather unani-
mously that management had been able to successfully use most of
their in-house trained people and there was no shortage of
skilled labor including the area of electronic devices used in
the new CNC machines.
13. Of greater concern to a number of policy makers today is
Brazil's sliding back in providing secondary and higher education
to an increasing number of students. Although Brazil's degree of
industrialization is above the average of the NICs, and skill
intensive sectors are playing a major role in the industrializa-
tion process, the share of youngsters that attended secondary
schools and go on for higher education is substantially below not
For a discussion of the effects of these policies, see Spinan-
ger 1988.
2
For a discussion of the flexibility of the sector to train its
manpower in the 1950s and 1960s see Leff, 1968, Ch. III.54
only the averages of the East Asian competitors but also Mexico.
A glance at the expenditures going to education is even more dis-
heartening. After having been half of what it was in Korea, Tai-
wan and Mexico in 1965, they fell back to less than a quarter in
1984 (see Table A17). While in-house training seems to have pro-
vided a successful undertaking which has supported Brazilian
industry's move into the production of more sophisticated prod-
ucts, it would not seem difficult to forecast that the basis for
that kind of training will be become increasingly inadequate.
Modernization, Subsidies and Capital Intensity of NEM
14. The earlier discussion has shown the intensity of the Brazi-
lian effort to invest in machinery and equipment and modernize
(Section B). Evidence from the engineering sector itself shows
that investment in those industries also proceeded faster than
output during the 1970s and early 1980s. Those investments were
largely financed by sources external to the firms, a substantial
amount of which at subsidized interest rates.
15. The major financing agency was the National Development Bank,
the loans of which reached an average of over US$ 200 mill. p.a.
between 1974 and 1976, but then declined to an average of about
US$ 60 mill, for the rest of the decade. As Table 17 shows that
financial support concentrated on saving engineering firms from
financial distress in the early 1980s. That action, together with
renewed finance for investment and continued high protection
should have given capital goods producers a chance to regroup and
modernize. The evidence is not yet in, but it is more likely that
by preventing exit, these policies hindered industry to adjust
forcefully, permitting firms to further diversify rather than to
specialize.
16. The subsidies in long- and short-term credit combined with
the desire of many producers to buy the latest rather than the
most effective equipment led to a less than satisfactory use of55
the factor capital in many firms. In addition to price and
availability, the efficient use of capital depends also on the
organizational management which the expensive equipment and the
complex production process of capital goods entails in general
and the ability to spread indivisible investment capacities over
larger volumes of output.
17. in the industrialized countries, the manufacture of parts and
components and processes like casting, forging and heat treatment
are mostly carried out by ancillary firms under subcontracting
arrangements. This is not the case in the NICs, where plants are
more vertically integrated. It is therefore not surprising to
find in the case of Brazil, India and Korea that there has been a
tendency towards large firms in the NEM branch, quite different
from the typical medium size in ACs. However, while one would
expect that large size should generate economies of scale, ob-
servers of the industry have reported a prevalence of inadequate
scales in individual product lines, together with clearcut trends
toward increased product diversification .
18. In Brazil, the evidence is mixed. As shown earlier, installed
capacity has been fully utilized by the industry as a whole, but
it seems that only a few firms are rigorously specializing. The
largest machine tool producer, ROMI, has strenghtened his spe-
cialization in traditional lathe production. He has also invested
large sums - financed by special credit from BNDES - into new CNC
machinery and equipment at the same time when he is streamling
the production of conventional lathes. On the other hand, Bra-
zil's largest producer of special machinery, VILARES, has diver-
sified into many other branches as have most other firms, whose
diversification has occurred often as a consequence of high fluc-
tuations in demand from domestic users of specialized capital
goods and the inability of the firm to sell abroad.
1 Datta Mitra [1979].56
Table 17 - The National Development Bank's Role in Financing Capital Goods Expansion and























































































































Source: World Bank [19891.57
Foreign Investment, Technological Change, and High Cost Produc-
tion
19. In that context it may be interesting to postulate that for-
eign investment in Brazil's machinery sector should have been
contributing with their traditional organizational strength to
higher efficiency of capital used in that sector. While not so
dominating as in the transport sector, foreign firms have played
an important part in the development of the NEM sector since
World War II. As Tables A18 to A20 show, foreign investment par-
ticipated with 30% to 45% in three major branches of the NEM
sector, i.e. industrial equipment for basic industries and elec-
tric energy, machinery for specific industries, and machine
tools. In all cases, Brazilian firms are the largest producers,
but it is especially in the machine tool branch where the foreign
suppliers are of substantially smaller size than the two leading
Brazilian firms. Most of them are not vertically integrated but
have managed to build up a reliable net work of component prod-
ucers, which has made it possible to not only sell in the do-
mestic market but also abroad.
20. Besides the discussion of foreign investment's contribution
to the balance of payments, which has kept economists occupied in
Brazil for many years, the more recent investigations have con-
centrated on technology, its transfer, adaptation and further
development . While the BNDES study recognized the crucial role
of foreign investments in transferring technology, a broad exa-
mination of that issue in the case of complex capital goods in
Brazil and other newly industrializing countries came to the
conclusion that the technological impact of foreign firms on the
host country was more limited than the impact made by the more
enterprising indigenous producers. In the latter case, it was
stated that despite "relying on licensing agreements for some of
the technology needed to make complex capital goods and the in-
trinsic limitations of the agreements, domestic firms surveyed





21. At the same time it was also pointed out that the national
firms still concentrated on adaptive work, i.e. detailed designs
of parts and components. What was found missing was the basic
design capacity, particularly in fields which are subject to more
rapid technological change. In the case of electronic equipment
which has become an important input in the machinery sector in
general and machine tool industry in particular, the Brazilian
government decided to take the initiative and reserve the pro-
duction of these elements for national producers, banning not
only all imports but also closing the door for joint ventures in
that field.
22. While the rather heavy handed import substitution policies
have been discussed widely, it has been difficult to quantify the
costs involved . In the case of machine tools, the industry got
together in connection with the planned import tariff reform of
1988 to discuss comparative cost and prices and to analyze the
major inputs and their relative importance in the production of a
2 number of machines which are most common in this branch . The
results are summarized in Table 18, which compares three types of
lathes.
23. Column 1 shows the relative price ratios for major inputs in
Brazil and a number of industrialized countries. What immediately
becomes apparent is the high ratio for electronic components and
automation elements, which play a crucial role in the CNC ma-
chines. In 1987, five years after the Brazilian government had
begun supporting domestic firms to build the electronic compo-
nents, their price was still over three times the one offered by
foreign competitors. The impact on the production costs of the
CNC lathes can be seen from columns (5) and (7), which show the
additional costs the Brazilian machine tool producer had to bear,
based on his current production structure.
See for example, Schumacher and Wilkens [1989], Corsepius and
Schipke [1989].
2 ABIMAQ [1988].59

































































PB/PI = Brazilian prices over international prices.
Columns (2), (4), (6): Cost



















































































































Source: ABIMAQ/SINDIMAQ [19871 and own calculations.60
24. In the case of the simple CNC lathe, the extra costs amounted
to nearly 60% of total production costs and in the case of the
more complex lathe it increase to about 80%. The case is very
similar with other machine tools such as milling and grinding
machines and the more complex machine center. In each case,
production costs were raised far beyond the possibility to
compete with imports, and even less to sell in export markets.
25. Table 18 gives also some clues about costs of other inputs,
which were above world prices and made it difficult for the Bra-
zilian producer to compete actively in foreign markets, even in
the case of the traditional lathes. While at a much more reduced
scale, the expensive electrical components also played an
important role to raise costs. In addition, the more expensive
ball bearings and the auxiliary machinery increased production
costs of the traditional lathe by nearly 40% more than its
foreign competitors.
26. While a one year comparison of a particular branch, which is
currently undergoing rapid technological change, should not lead
to a hasty generalization in an analysis of a sector which has
been found to be efficient, both in terms of input use and the
capturing of foreign markets, the cost data in the machine tool
branch are an indicator of the current problems facing an im-
portant part of the machinery sector.61
F. PROSPECTS FOR AND PROBLEMS OF MACHINERY PRODUCTION AND EX-
PORTS
1. On the basis of the above findings of past and present per-
formance of the machinery sector, it is now possible to examine
the future perspectives of this sector. More than any other in-
dustrial branch, NEM production is closely linked to all other
industries and depends on overall growth of the manufacturing and
infrastructure sector to nearly 100%, as is shown in the input-
output relationships for earlier years (see Table A21). In addi-
tion, export expansion has become increasingly important as a
source of growth, reaching close to 20% in the mid-1980s. Given
the problems the intensified import substitution policies have
brought in the recent past, export efforts can be considered not
only contributing to improved competitiveness but also renewed
growth of the industry.
2. While capital goods in general and machinery production in
particular are purchased by industrial enterprises of the same or
other branches, the demand analysis of past, current and future
developments can be linked to the very same variables which de-
termine the production of industrial output in general : per
capita income and the investment-output ratio, to be taken as
proxies for representing domestic demand. An index of world
income can be used to represent external demand from the rest of
the world.
3. The empirical analysis, regressing apparent demand for NEM
products with per capita income and the overall investment ratio
of the economy, provides a good fit and the coefficients are
statistically significant. The same is true for the estimates of
import demand . Under different assumptions about the development
of the major independent variables for the years to come, it is
The export demand equation has a significantly lower correla-
tion coefficient. Here it would seem to be more important to
maintain the incentive on the supply side as expressed by a re-
latively high correlation between the real effective exchange
rate and NEM exports.62
Table 19 - Estisates of Past, Present and Future Derand for Brazil's HEM Sector
Dependent Variable
I Domestic Denand lnDD =
II Export Demand 1nX -
III Inport Demand lnM -
Y/N = per capita incone; I/Q =
from 1965 to 1974 = 0 and from
lues in brackets.
Exogenous Variables
World Incone (Index 1980=100)
Per Capita Income Brazil (in
Invest-Output Ratio
Dummy Variable
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Source: Table A7, own calculations.63
possible to forecast the demand for machinery for 1995 and the
year 2000. Table 19 shows two scenarios, with the first making
rather cautious and pessimistic assumption of Brazilian income
and investment growth, given the economic and political uncer-
tainties. The second one introduces slightly more optimistic
parameters, based on the assumption that a number of steps dis-
cussed below are undertaken and that the new Brazilian government
will be in the position to reduce the public sector deficit and
with it decelerate the high rate of inflation.
4. As Graph 7 indicates that even under the optimistic assump-
tions, Brazil's NEM sector will only be back "on the track" by
1995. More realistic is the second set of projections which shows
that the domestic demand for non electrical machinery will reach
the 1980 level of about 14 bill. US$ equivalent by 1994/95, to be
just below US$ 20 bill, by the end of the century. In any case,
total production and sales in the nineties will be significantly
below the potential of this industry as was pointed out by the
President of the Association of Machinery Producers (ABIMAQ). In
a 1989 interview, opening a round table conference on the future
of the machinery sector, he maintained that the gap between the
actual and the potential output would be 1:3 by the end of the
1980s . He forgot to mention that the NEM sector had gone through
an unprecedented expansion and diversification period which was
bound to face obstacles, once the economy would slow down.
5. As Table 20 shows, Brazil has increased its engineering
product diversification more than any other country in the world.
Between 1970 and 1984 the number of products jumped from 25 to
92, catapulting the country into the top ten of capital goods
producers in terms of number of products. Interestingly enough
that list is not led by the advanced market economies but by two
countries of the socialist bloc. Even an organization which has
wholeheartedly supported the NICs
1 move into capital goods pro-
duction, has warned LDCs in 1986, that "very few industrialized
countries manufacture the complete range of machinery and equip-
1 ABIMAQ [1989].64
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ment, and intra-industry trade is extensive in this industry.
Developing countries will need to be selective in the range of
machinery and equipment that they plan to produce" (UNIDO, 1986,
pp. 86-87).
6. With respect to exports, prospects should be brighter. But
while the trend towards international protectionism should be
less stringent in this branch than in many others, competition
will become tougher, mostly from continuous improvements of NICs
competitors from South and East Asia. Given the problems of the
Brazilian economy and with it the danger of overvaluation of the
currency, one should not expect Brazil to relatively improve its
position. If Brazilian firms can maintain the share in the more
traditional NEM fields, which become increasingly standardized
they will have accomplished quite a task. For breakthroughs in
the more complex capital goods, rather drastic policy changes are
required.
7. A major factor which will determine success in the more so-
phisticated NEM markets is the further progress made in techno-
logical change from traditional to CNC machinery. While the elec-
tronic revolution has entered the Brazilian NEM sector, current
differences in production costs, which have shown only marginal
declines in the last few years, will result in loss of potential
market shares abroad and a lingering unwillingness to engage in
the costly investments to be made in Brazil proper. While not all
subsectors are fully involved in the electronic revolution, its
importance and impact is bound to grow, requiring Brazilian prod-
ucers to rigorously specialize and to reduce production costs.
8. Prospects for a more pragmatic technology development are
good in terms of positions being held by government and firms at
this point in time. Both parties have prepared sectoral plans for
the years to come. Among others, the following policies are now
being proposed to overcome the supply bottlenecks: (1) Increase
the competitiveness of domestic electronics market by allowing
exit of weak firms and with it reduce overcrowding of domestic
supply to gain economies of scale and lower costs; (2) allow66
joint ventures and a more flexible import policy of microelectro-
nic components for the machinery sector; (3) co-ordinate between
electronics and informatics with user industries (i.e. besides
NEM and auto, Telecom & Radio/TV); and (4) make better use of R&D
and manpower developed and trained at universities and technolo-
gical centers .
9. Linked to both, new and/or improved technology and qualified
labor, is the need for generating the resources to finance them.
Whereas the public sector will hardly be able to collect the
necessary funds to fully support research and development or
training in this sector, private NEM sector firms have - in spite
of the last disappointing decade - accumulated enough savings
plus in-house technology to continue with investment in those
areas. If indeed the slowdown in the 1980s was used by the firms
to heavily modernize, they should be able to respond flexibly and
2
forcefully to the challenge of international competitors .
10. This in turn requires a more stable monetary and fiscal
policy as well as a more flexible trade policy environment, both
of which are not given at present and are doubtful to develop
rapidly in the next five years. The new and more pragmatic model
of industrialization in Brazil is seen by some of its most cri-
tical observers as one which is not only able to incorporate the
latest electronic innovations into the production process but
which is open to a more stringent competitive pressure from
abroad. In addition, it is suggested to decrease state parti-
cipation in the economy, both for the financial problems cited
above as well as for the need of improving resource allocation in
3
sectors dominated by state monopolies .
1 Meyer-Staden [1989].
2 Lanz [1986].
3 Braga and Matesco [1989].67



















































































1. The major purpose of the study on Brazil's non-electrical
machinery was to examine the international competitiveness of the
sector. It was postulated that - contrary to earlier notions -
Brazil should (1) have developed a comparative advantage in a
number of NEM subsectors and that (2) the growth of exports and
success in penetrating an increasing number of markets with an
increasing number of products were not a consequence of over-
generous incentives but first and foremost based on real progress
in factor productivity.
2. The findings gave support to the two contentions made above.
While export-output ratios of most firms remained modest, the
analysis of the revealed comparative advantage indicated that
close to ten subsectors of the NEM branch had at one time or
another performed well, i.e. shown above average participation in
Brazil's own exports vis-a-vis world exports. True enough, the
winners were the relatively less human capital intensive branches
which are normally produced at larger numbers, but there were
also some significant gains in exporting more complex NEM prod-
ucts beyond the markets of the Latin American neighbors and some
other LDCs.
3. Moreover, there was no evidence of excessive export sub-
sidies, neither in the late 1970s when Brazil's NEM exports
reached their peak nor in the mid 1980s, when they recovered from
the crisis of the second oil shock. On the contrary, in both
years, the analysis found a slight anti-export bias which could
only be overcome through a more efficient use of productive fac-
tors than in most other sectors of manufacturing.
4. In explaining the significant factor productivity increases
in the 1970s and early 1980s, a line of reasoning was pursued
which had been expressed earlier by observers of the capital6 9
goods industry in the 1950s and 60s, showing the efficiency of
the Brazilian "learning by doing" and "in-house" training" pro-
grams. While the relevance of these programs was found to have
remained important for fostering the rapid adjustment of the
Brazilian labor force to the high standards of the industry,
doubts were raised as to the viability of these measures in the
future, given the fact that school education on the secondary and
higher level had badly suffered over the last 20 years.
5. In the case of capital both, the inflow of foreign capital
and the increasing support of the National Development Bank for
the domestic firms were found to be plentiful and crucial to
build up the NEM sector in the 1970s. Foreign investment was
assumed to have an advantage over domestic investment in terms of
administering and managing the complex production process of
capital goods, but it was found that firms in the NEM branch
which were foreign owned or controlled were not more efficient in
using their capital than the domestic firms. While it was not
possible to provide empirical evidence for the superior effi-
ciency of foreign investors during the 1970s, the test for many
national firms, which have been supported by the National Devel-
opment Bank, is still to be taken, once the industrial strategy
will shift away from import substitution to a more open environ-
ment .
6. Embodied in most capital goods is technology, the advance of
which was particularly rapid in a number of NEM branches, such as
machines and equipment for whole industrial complexes and machine
tools. While new technologies had been introduced either through
foreign investment or licensing in the early post-war period,
increasing attempts were undertaken by local industrialists to
adapt and develop technologies by themselves. While concerns by
the students of the process of technology transfer and adaptation
remain because most firms have still very limited resources for
basic design and development, it is suggested that the benefits
to be derived from mastering these complex skills may be still
substantially below the costs involved.7~0
7. Throughout the essay, the development of the machine tool
sector was traced to highlight a number of specific issues of
NEMs. Among them were the possibilities to expand exports of
complex goods to industrialized markets, which was answered with
a conditional yes. In the case of technological advancements, the
current adaptation and development of microprocessor controlled
machine tools was briefly outlined, since the substantial lite-
rature on the subject of the market reserve for a number of
electronic products going to the NEM sector has been examined
elsewhere. In analyzing the cost structure of a number of lathes
with different technological sophistication (as well as some
other machine tools), it was found that the market reservation
policy for electronic devices for machine tools had rendered
those machines uncompetitive in world markets for the last 5-7
years and doubts were raised if prices could be significantly
reduced until 1992 when Brazil is planning to open up this sector
to foreign competition.
8. As a consequence, current proposals to provide for a more
flexible framework of the electronics policy were reiterated and
complemented with additional evidence from recent studies on that
subject. In addition, it was pointed out that unless the macro-
conditions were improving, it would be unlikely for the branch to
resume its export drive, particularly if lagging exchange rates
continue for a while. In that context, it was found useful to
build on some of the recommendations provided earlier by some
Brazilian critiques and policy makers, who have maintained that
the time has come to (1) open up the industrial sector in general
and the electronic subsector in particular and (2) to reduce the
public sector's share in industry and infrastructure.71


















Machinery Other Than Electrical
Boilers, steam generating
Engines, internal combustion for aircraft
Turbines, jet and gas for aircraft
Engines, diesel for motor vehicles
Engines, internal combustion for motor vehicles
Scales, industrial
Scales, other than industrial
Manufactures of Machinery, Except Electrical
Ovens, household
Stoves, ranges, cookers


































































































































































Source: UNIDO [1984 and 1988]73
Table A3 - Importance of New Products for NEM Firms and













































Source: Mac Graw-Hill Survey [various years] cited in Dick
[1981].74

























































































































































































































Table A5 - Participation of CNC Machines in Total Machine Tools














































Source: Edquist and Jacobsen [1988]76



































































































































































































Source: ONIDO [19841 and own calculations.77
Table A7 - Brazil: Basic Statistics on Population, Income, Pro-















































































































































Source: UNCTAD [Handbook of International Trade and Development Sta-
tistics, various issues]; own calculations.78



















































































Ball and Roller Bearings
Other Mach. Non-elec.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: UNCTAD, special tabulations.79
Table A9 - Ranking of RCA
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Source: ONCTAD, special tabulations; own calculations.80
Table A10 -Estimate of Interest Rate Subsidy Granted to Capital Goods Producer by the National Development
Bank (BNOES) in the 1970s
Nominal Rate Payments
Price Index (1977=100)





















Total loan amount : 100








































































































































































Source: World Bank [1989].81














































































Source: FGV [various issues]; own calculations.82













































Source: World Bank [1981]; own calculations.83















































































































































































































Source: Fasano-Filho [19871; own calculations84
















































a = output elasticity of capital
0 = output elasticity of labor
Y = Hicks neutral technological program

















































































































































































































































Source: FIBGE [b, 1975, 1980J; own calculations.86
Table A16 - Labour Harket Regulations and their Impact on Plant Operations
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Table Al8 - Capital Goods on Order: Major Pirns Producing Equipment for











































(1) 18*. Participation of Sumito Group (Japan
(2) 17.5*. Participation of
of Itoh&Co. (Japan)














































































(1) 3.6% Participation of I
(2) 40.9% Participation of
(3) 28.0% Participation of
(4) 47.7% Participation of






























TCC Chicago (USA) and 1.18%
Schuler (FRG)
Davy McKee Part. (USA)
PHB WeserMlte (FRG)
Chisso Fug. (Japan)
(6) Participation of British capital
(7) 30.0% Participation of AEG-Kanis Turbinen (FRG)











































































































































































































































































Source: BALANCO ANUAL, Gazeta Mercantil.. 91
Table A21 - Input-Output Coefficients of NEM with Most Important











Electric Apparatus & Goods
Automobile & Parts
Railway and other Transport
..Equipment
Total Inputs & Outputs of





























Source: FIBGE, unpublished Input-Output Table,92
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